Thirty-Two
Principal Doctrines of the Stoa

Second edition

written by

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CONTENTS

Cover illustration of the "Black Eagle" was created by the author. The 32 feathers of the eagle represent the 32 principal doctrines. Symbols of the breastplate represent the Phenomenon of Existence as first designed by the author in 1984 and is now the emblem of the Black Eagle Stoic Monastery. (See Appendix A, page 17)

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Preface

This volume focuses on Logic, Physics, and Ethics, the three fundamental areas of Stoic studies from Zeno to Marcus Aurelius. To the Classical Stoics, philosophy was incomplete if any of these three elements were missing. For a half millennium, Stoicism was a leading philosophy of the Greco-Roman world and considered essential knowledge for literate Greeks and Romans.

Classical Stoic education involved school-based learning (lectures, discussions, readings, et cetera) along with practical exercises. Although the classical curriculum ordinarily addressed logic first, in this volume the author chose to arrange the categories of existence as a kind of flow from the divine to the individual. Each of the principal doctrines are worthy of focused thought and contemplation, but that will be a project for you the reader—if you choose to embrace the Stoa as your own.

Acknowledgment

Acknowledgment and appreciation is given to my mentor, Professor Keith Campbell, Chairman of the Philosophy Department of the University of Sydney, for his helpful comments and suggestions. Your patience and insights will always be remembered.

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Physics

1. God, the One

God, the One, the Divine Intelligence is continuous in space and time and corporeality. It is the activating Force permeating and organizing inert matter to create the living body and fate of the cosmos. It has these attributes:

a) **Logos:** the Divine Fire creates as it pervades and expands inert matter, defining existence as an evolving, dynamic process. Logos is the Seminal Reason of creation beginning in the same manner as the intelligence in the apple seed that grows and evolves into an apple tree.
b) **Pneuma:** the Divine Breath in conjunction with the Logos enters, defines, and rules inert matter, producing an internal tension (*tonos)* by moving from the center of an object to its surface, then returning to its center again. Pneuma is the World Soul that pervades and directs all material bodies in the cosmos with a spark of divine intelligence.

Belief in the Stoic god is based upon reason and argument, not myth, revelation, or faith. Classical Stoic belief is that the Stoic god is Nature, conscious and providential, with continual interaction between all parts of the Whole no matter how distant they may be from one another (cosmic sympathy).

2. Corporeality: the Active & Passive Principles

God, the One, is both the Active Principle of World Soul, and Passive Principle of inert matter, corporeal bodies that occupy space and are causally efficient. When the World Soul enters inert matter, each body occupies the same space by total blending (*crasis*), just as wine is totally blended in water. Stoicism is both a physicalist and vitalist philosophy. Bodies can be dominated by either principle: the more the Active Principle dominates a body, the more rational and divine; the more the Passive Principle dominates, the less rational and divine.

Ontology deals with all questions about the physical world. The *fundamental* ontological position of Stoic physics is that only bodies exist. Even certain intangible things like soul, justice, virtue, and wisdom actually do exist and are bodies because they are aspects of soul, a tension of Pneuma, that can act or be acted upon.

There appears to be a conflict between holding these two principles and being strict monists, but by giving an account of a material world that does not refer to anything outside of Nature in order to explain its movement or development, the Stoics propose that the Active and the Passive Principles are two aspects of a single, unified cosmos acting upon itself.

3. A Dynamic Continuum

God and matter, opposite principles of Active and Passive are united into One, a continuum without independent parts, fluid, and in a state of becoming. It is a closed system, a spherical body existing as

an island in an infinite sea of void, a cosmos feeding and growing out of itself, made up of imperfect and incomplete parts in mutual exchange and dependency with each other to create the perfect whole. On the Stoic continuum there is a dynamic interaction of forces whereby time is inseparably bound to events as an interval of cosmic motion, beginning and ending with the life cycle of the universe.

4. Four Elements

Classical Stoics distinguish between the Principles and the Elements. The four elements are Earth & Water, Air & Fire. Earth & Water are heavy elements dominated by the Passive Principle; Air & Fire are light elements dominated by the Active Principle. Organic bodies are distinguished from inorganic bodies by the composition of the active elements that animate them. Today, we may view the four elements as symbolic representations of reality.

5. Four Categories

Scala naturae, a physical continuum where each category is increasingly specific and complex and includes the category before it. That is, category four builds on category three, which builds on category two, which is built upon category one. The Four Categories are:

1. Substratum: shapeless matter before it is permeated by the Pneuma.
2. Quality: the Pneuma totally blended with the substratum creating a body.
3. State: each body made cohesive and defined by its unique mixture of the Pneuma:
    a) Cohesive state – *hexis.* Bodies are held together by a two-way motion. Pneuma motion begins at the center of the object, simultaneously moving to the surface and back again producing an internal tension, *tonos,* that creates the cohesive state.
    b) Organic Nature – *hexis & phusis*. Bodies that grow and reproduce but have no apparent cognitive ability or soul.
    c) Non-rational animals – *hexis, phusis, & psuche* (soul). Animals with impulse and perception but not reason.
    d) Rational animals (human) – *hexis, phusis, psuche, & Logos* (reason). Reason is a collection of conceptions and preconceptions gradually accumulated from birth and formed in the manner of internal speech, the language of thought.
4. Relative State: external relationships between any two bodies and internal changes taking place within a body, thereby changing that relationship. (e.g., Man picking apples has a heart attack and leans against a tree for support. Man dies, falls to the ground, disintegrates, and the tree uses man for nourishment.)

6. Incorporeal

A distinction is made between the corporeal and incorporeal (*lekta*, void, place, and time). Only corporeal bodies exist; the incorporeal subsists. The test of what is corporeal and incorporeal is that only a body, that which exists, can act and be acted upon.

1. *Lekton*: the meaning of a word. A spoken word is corporeal and exists as a body of vibrating air; a written word exists as a symbol acting on a surface such as a piece of paper; but the *meaning*

of a word is incorporeal (see 14).

2. Void: infinite in every direction, the void begins at the edge of the cosmos. There is no void within the cosmos.
3. Place: the place a body occupies is incorporeal.
4. Time: only the present is real, and it is comprised of the past and future. Time is continuous, without independent existence, and is rationally divided into parts, such as past and future, to understand the movement of the corporeal. The present moment you are experiencing right now does not exist or subsist, it belongs, and by straddling the past and future it connects both in an unbroken chain of causes.

7. Eros: The Creative Force

Eros, what the ancient Greeks called the God of Love, is the creative force that unifies opposites, the male and female as active and passive principles of existence. All living things perceive this phenomenon from their own perspective according to their ability to understand and participate in it. Life is created, nurtured, and recreated by what we experience as and what the Early Greeks named, *Love*. As a physical manifestation and drive of Nature it is as necessary as eating, sleeping, growth, and dissolution.

8. Death

Cosmic Death. Early Stoics followed the Heraclitean concept of a cosmos that was periodically destroyed by the purifying fire of Logos (*ekpyrosis*), then reborn again and again. The mythical phoenix was a commonly used metaphor for this phenomenon of rising from the ashes of fiery self-destruction. And by this recurring event, the cosmos was never created, never destroyed, always was and always will be eternal. When the universe was burned away, the only thing remaining of the World Soul was Pure Soul. Later Stoics, such as Panaetius and Posidonius, rejected both *ekpyrosis* and individual immortality.

Human Death. When the two bodies of the active and passive principles are totally blended, they retain their individual properties and can be separated at death. The human soul (*pneuma psychikon)*, loosens its tension and separates from the mortal body at death. After leaving the material behind, it eventually merges with the World Soul, sooner or later, depending on differing opinions. Some Stoics believe the human soul returns to the World Soul right away; some believe the souls of the wise are caught up with the conflagration *(ekpyrosis)* at the end of the current cycle of the universe. On one thing all classical Stoics agree, there is no heaven or hell.

9. Causality, Fate, & Free will

Proof of the existence of causality is in the ordered appearance of all things: a tree produces a tree, a human produces a human, and summer follows spring. The course of the universe is predetermined by a chain of causes continuous through time and space. Stoics are unique in their theory of causality in their belief that only the cause is a body; effects are incorporeal. Effect is a change or difference in the relative *state* of that body but not a body in itself.

There are basically two kinds of causes: external and internal. The role of external causes is initiated at the cosmic level, Fate as divinity, originally based upon the ancient Greek concept of *Moira*, a daimon, a spinner of destiny of the individual's portion or lot within the Whole. Fate is a body, corporeal, to the classical Stoa, giving rise to a network of causes with all bodies in the universe as One. However, Stoics are not fatalists, because the Stoic god is not a deity that is removed from nature but is immanent in all parts of it. Thus our fate or destiny is also a realization of our inner natures.

The human soul (pneuma psychikon) is a spark of the divine reason, and when we give our assent to an impression our ensuing action produces a co-fated outcome. Free will is our conscious participation in a determined chain of multiple causes. Although the choices an individual makes is the product of a personality of inherited traits and early conditioning, this same personality can be affected by individual efforts to improve reason and avoid error. Herein lies the justification for personal effort and responsibility.

10. Structure of the Human Soul

The structure of the *pneuma psychikon* is made up of eight parts or streams: the five senses, plus the faculties of reproduction, speech, and command, the director of all the other parts, the *hegemonikon*. Classical Stoics believe that the five senses, plus reproduction and speech, are extensions of the *hegemonikon*, the command center. (The Stoics of antiquity believed the command center was located in the chest, the heart, the first functioning organ of the infant body, with all other faculties maturing at later dates as the person reaches adulthood. Stoics today accept the brain as the functioning organ of command.) All cognitive functions take place in the command center as a two-way system, the internal tension of Pneuma, moving from center to surface and back again. The relationship of the command faculty to the other faculties is sometimes compared to the head of an octopus to its arms, a tree to its branches, or a spider interpreting vibrations directed to the center of its web. The command faculty has four essential abilities: presentation, impulse, assent, and reason, the Logos. Only the human animal has the abilities of assent by reason.

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Logic

11. Presentations

The central theme of Stoic logic is the acquisition of knowledge (epistemology) and includes both speech and reason. Our epistemology is essentially empiricist but with a predisposition to moral notions. As a unique spark of the divine Logos, the pneuma-soul of the human child begins with innate structure and predispositions but without conceptual content, a blank sheet, *tabula rasa*. With time, the child is exposed to many sensory impressions, called presentations (*phantasia*). These impressions are sensory information plus unconscious value judgments forming propositions to the mind from which we make our choices.

Zeno introduced the idea of a presentation as an impression on the soul. Cleanthes likened these presentations to the impression a signet ring makes when pressed into hot wax. Chrysippus disagreed and said that if the soul were like wax, the presentations would be obliterated with each succeeding impression. What he proposed was that impressions on the soul were like sound waves on air, not wax, and that the pneuma-soul is capable of receiving many impressions simultaneously and sequentially without eliminating earlier impressions, but with each new impression the soul is modified and changes its condition. In addition to real-object sensory presentations, there are imaginary presentations – dreams, fantasies, and hallucinations (*phantastikon*) – which are produced by an internal manipulation of the mental content of previously stored presentations *(phantastikon* from a collection of *phantasiai)*.

12. From Memory to Reason

Presentations are stored, becoming what we know as memories. As the child matures, there is a gradual accumulation of real and imaginary presentations in the command center (*hegemonikon*), which is organized into groups or collections according to families of similarity. These we know as experience. An example of a family of similarity may be a collection of all the different kinds of dogs one has seen, heard, smelled, felt, and otherwise experienced in one's life. These collections of like presentations Chrysippus called *common notions*. These collections of memories increase in quantity and quality as the child becomes an experienced adult, providing a basis upon which the individual makes judgments about the truth or falsity of each new presentation received throughout the course of that life. These judgments we know as reason, which is apparent in a child by the age of seven and fully developed by the age of fourteen.

13. The Criterion of Truth

We either assent to the sensory impressions we receive, the so-called presentations, or we withhold judgment. It is the work of the command center, the *hegemonikon*, to discern which presentations are real or imaginary and which are true or false. It does this by comparing the immediate presentation with its common notions or collections of like presentations experienced in the past.

The *Chief Criterion of Truth*, then, is the common notion, and the common notion is a collection of like presentations. By having a common notion with which one can compare to the immediate presentation, one can anticipate what is its nature and can give assent to its legitimacy or truth. We assent to the clear and certain information of an adequate collection of presentations and withhold judgment when one does not have a sufficient collection of like presentations to form a common notion. With uncertainty we withhold assent.

14. Cognition (*Katalēpsis*)

Cognition, or what the Stoics of antiquity called *Katalēpsis*, is the *process of knowing* that occurs when one assents to an adequate impression. But, knowledge itself (*epistēmē*), is more than a single cognition. It is an organized pattern of interlocking cognitions – each one guaranteed by its causal history. The mental activity generated by a presentation is a physical event with four distinct stages: (1) Presentation, (2) Assent, (3) Apprehension, and (4) Knowledge. After the Presentation there is Assent, a modification of the pneuma-soul which the *hegemonikon* identifies on the basis of a common notion, the criterion of truth. Apprehension is the cognition of the Presentation, the *katalepsis*, a grasping of the Presentation by the *hegemonikon*.

Knowledge itself is best understood by Zeno's Presentation Teaching Method. According to Cicero, Zeno used to illustrate the concept of the Presentation by holding up his hand with outstretched fingers; when he bent his fingers a little, that was Assent; when he made a fist, that was Apprehension; and when he grasped that fist tightly with his other hand, that was Knowledge, which early Stoics thought to be possessed by none but the wise.

15. Thought

Presentations are either rational or non-rational. Stoics believe that only human beings are capable of rational presentations, or propositions, and this we call thought (*noesis*). Thoughts are also corporeal, or physical states of the pneuma-soul, which have the structure of language. Language is the medium that preserves and represents our knowledge, and every experience we have is mediated by language. Thought is language.

Thought is divided into three parts which are connected to one another: (1) the Sign, (2) the Significate, and (3) the Denotation. The Sign exists as the spoken word, which can be spoken either silently to oneself as an internal movement of the pneuma or as an external sound, a material vibration of air; the Significate is the meaning (*lekton*) of that word, which is incorporeal and does not have a separate body, because it *subsists* as meaning connected to the Sign and Denotation parts of thought; the Denotation is the actual material existence to which the Sign and Significate refer. For example, when I see a dog (the Presentation), and say the word, 'dog,' this is (1) the Sign; what dog as a concept means is (2) the Significate; and, the actual dog, a real material object, is (3) the Denotation.

16. Discourse

When I see a dog and *say* the word, 'dog,' I'm making a sound which means a real dog. Whereas Aristotle thought meaning, the Significate, was identical with its verbal expression, the Sign, the Stoics

believed it to be separate, which can be illustrated by the rather common occurrence of a slip of the tongue when one says something they don't mean (e.g., when one calls and apple a pear). To fully understand the meaning (*lekton*) of words as they are being thought requires they be analyzed within the context of discourse, their parts of speech. The Stoics of antiquity are credited with being the first to name the parts of speech, as well as the cases of nouns and tenses of verbs.

17. Dialectic and the Syllogism

In addition to the structure of language and the relationship of words to things, Stoic logic is concerned with what constitutes valid forms of reasoning. Aristotle was the first to develop logical forms of reasoning which he called syllogisms. But unlike the universal terms of Aristotle's syllogisms, the Stoic Chrysippus developed five basic syllogisms using ordinal numbers to represent *propositions* connecting either the universal *or* the particular. These five syllogisms are valid argument forms that remain valid even if the conclusion is untrue. The Stoic syllogisms developed by Chrysippus are:

1. If the 1st, the 2nd; the 1st, therefore, the 2nd. (*modus ponendo ponens*)
2. If the 1st, the 2nd; not the 2nd; therefore, not the 1st. (*modus tollendo tollens*)
3. Not the 1st and the 2nd; the 1st; therefore, not the 2nd.
4. Either the 1st or the 2nd; the 1st; therefore, not the 2nd. (*modus ponendo tollens*)
5. Either the 1st or the 2nd; not the 2nd; therefore, the 1st. (*modus tollendo ponens*)

Propositions are of two kinds: corporeal and incorporeal. The corporeal are bodies that exist and the incorporeal are meanings that subsist. In dialectic, we analyze propositions that are incorporeal, sayable thoughts. That is, any thought that can be said or spoken. And of the sayables there are two kinds: a complete or incomplete thought. When we say a complete thought we have made a propositions, and we call this an assertible. Assertibles, are of four kinds: True, false, simple, or complex complete thoughts that can be used to form the syllogism. A syllogism is a conclusion that follows necessarily from its premises.

Classical Stoic logic is highly technical and has been largely underappreciated . Today, the Stoic Chrysippus is considered a pioneer in the development of propositional logic, which is closely related to modern Boolean logic. In fact, classical Stoic logic anticipated modern developments in discrete mathematics and artificial intelligence by more than 2,000 years

Due to the highly technical and subtle nature of Stoic logic, no further attempts to synthesize it will be made, except to point out that as a subject, the syllogisms of the Stoics were misunderstood, disparaged, and/or largely ignored for 2,000 years until the early twentieth century when their sophistication was finally understood by scholars who now recognize that Chrysippus was the leading logician of antiquity in the development of formal logic.

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Ethics

18. Preconception

The Doctrine of Preconception (*prolepsis*) recognizes that although the human infant is a blank slate, *tabula rasa*, at birth, it has a number of preconceptions or innate dispositions towards forming certain kinds of concepts. The greatest of the preconception impulses are those two that encourage the formation of both the concepts of the Good and of God.

19. Impulse

Impulse is the movement of the soul toward or away from something according to whether it appears to be beneficial or harmful. All living animals are spurred to action by impulse. Our first impulse is not to seek pleasure, as the Epicureans believe, but to seek that which is most fitting for our survival. Pleasure is incidental to this primary impulse. It is natural for human children and other animals to live by the primary impulse, which we call instinct, which non-rational creatures will live by all their lives. But when the human child matures, presentations are examined by reason, and the impulse immediately following presentation only continues to exist when there is assent.

A bird that sees a worm will immediately pick it up. Impulse follows presentation. A small child may do the same, but with experience will learn that the worm is of no use to its personal well being. Thus, whereas the bird will pick up the worm all its life, the human child changes, and in a few years the presentation of a worm no longer elicits the response of an impulse to pick it up. The reasoning soul does not assent to the presentation. No impulse, no action.

20. Appropriation (*oikeiosis*)

There are two stages of impulse beginning in our relationship with ourselves, followed by our relationship to others. The dearest thing each living thing knows is its own self, and the primary impulse from birth onward is self preservation. How could Nature be benevolent or even survive if it created life forms that felt alien to their individual selves? Nature created the most basic impulse of all life forms to have an affinity to the self, to seek that which is appropriate to the survival of this self, and to avoid that which threatens its survival.

However, as reason and socialization develop in the human self, so too do our relationships to others, Social Oikeiosis, and we come to know there are times when virtuous acts, such as duty and altruism, may be the only good, even when detrimental to self-preservation. The natural affinity we feel to our self, spanning the two stages of impulse, from self-preservation to other preservation, is the Doctrine of Appropriation (*oikeiosis*). Unlike Plato's theory of an absolute good to which all values may be referred, Oikeiosis is both naturalistic and physiological.

21. The Good

Things that exist are the good, the bad, and the indifferent. Good is virtue, *aretē,* excellence, and it supports the survival of the rational faculty and excellence of the soul. Human excellence is moral excellence. The wise man will always do what is right, what is right is what is good, what is good is what is virtuous, and therefore the wise man is the virtuous man. There are four cardinal virtues: wisdom, justice, courage, and decorum (*sophrosyne*). These virtues are the good (*agathon*), the only good, and their achievement is the good or excellence of the wise man, the philosopher.

Moral excellence is the perfection of virtue (*aretē*), which the wise man cultivates as an art, the art of living. Because the perfection of virtue is the work of the wise, only the wise truly know virtue. And, because virtue is the only good, it alone is sufficient for happiness (*eudaimonia*). All those things which people commonly call good (e.g., health, wealth, and powerful position) may be preferred when compared to their opposites (sickness, poverty, and servitude), but when compared to virtue they are matters of indifference. Only that which is good and can never be used for undue gain and immoral purposes qualifies unequivocally as good. Only the virtues are good in every situation and on every occasion, and therefore qualify for the name that must always be honorable, the Good.

22. The Bad

What we commonly call bad (*kakon*) is not really bad. Sickness, poverty, and exile are matters of indifference to the wise. Even death, because it is the inevitable and natural process of change, is neither good nor bad and must be a matter of indifference. There is no evil in Nature, only in human beings who live without virtue. Just as virtue is the only good, so it is that the acts of persons who are lacking in virtue are the only sources of evil in this world. And, because evil is simply the lack of virtue, it is not measured by degrees.

23. The Indifferent

Many things we *commonly* call good or bad (see above) are neither good nor bad and are only indifferent. Only virtue is good, and only the lack of virtue is bad. However, Stoics do recognize that even things that are indifferent can have value to the flourishing of a human life. Thus, we identify three kinds of indifferents, which are:

1. Preferred: contributing to our well-being
2. Neutral
3. Non-preferred: contributing to the deterioration of our well-being

It is natural to prefer being healthy, wealthy, and respected, because it is in accord with Nature to prefer conditions that contribute to the flourishing of our rational faculty. But, if we give too much value to those things not in our control, such as the preferred indifferents, then we will be frustrated and emotional when we are unable to get them. Neutral indifferents are things that are absolutely indifferent, even trivial, such as whether to wear a blue or red necktie, or go to a Chinese or Italian restaurant for dinner. Sickness, poverty, and alienation, the non-preferred indifferents, often limit one's natural abilities. But, regardless of which kind of indifferent is being experienced, happiness is

always achieved when virtue is the true goal.

24. Right Action

The wise know it is how one aims the bow and arrow in life, not whether one hits the target, that truly matters. And, how one goes about achieving those things that have value and are appropriate to one's nature is what the Stoic calls *right action*. Right action, then, means using rational choice and action consistent with wisdom, justice, courage, and decorum to obtain those things that have value, and are thus preferred, and to avoid those things without value and not preferred.

A rational being preserves oneself as a rational being by pursuing two types of appropriate actions: the preferred indifferents and the completely correct. Appropriate actions as preferred indifferents are value neutral, while appropriate actions as completely correct actions are *good* because they are acts of virtue. One may act in a reasonable way without thought or effort. Their actions may be appropriate, but they will not be completely correct unless there has been conscious deliberation. The one whose actions result from conscious choice is preferable, because they will arrive at a firm conclusion that is derived from the internal mental disposition of virtue.

25. Emotions

The Doctrine of Emotions hold that emotions are the product of judgments. Emotion does not follow judgment; an emotion *is* a judgment. Stoics do *not* believe with Plato that the soul is divided against itself into rational and irrational parts where the irrational, symbolized by wild beasts, continually threatens to overcome the rational. The human soul is all reason with many functions. In judgments, the command center, the *hegemonikon* of the soul, is reasoning that presentations are either true, false, or uncertain. A judgment is an emotional judgment when it is a false judgment. Emotional judgments are false judgments about what is good and bad; false judgments about what is good or bad inflame the impulse of the soul to excessive action. As Chrysippus said, unlike the steady gait of a wise soul regulated by reason's true judgments, when the ignorant soul makes a false and, therefore, emotional judgment, the steady gait lurches forward. When normal, healthy impulses become excessive, the soul becomes like a man running down hill, unable to stop on command.

This is the process leading to the formation of an emotion:

1. Impression: something we receive from the external world over which we have no control.
2. First movement: an immediate physical responses to impressions *before* the judgment of assent, while a genuine emotion is formed *after* there has been time to form a judgment or opinion about that impression.
3. Unconscious value judgment: sometimes we add an unconscious value judgment to the first movement ascribing good or bad to something that is indifferent,
4. Assent: If we assent to an unconscious value judgment that something is good or bad when it is indifferent, then an emotion arises.

26. Passion

An emotional judgment is a false judgment and is therefore contrary to reason. Any judgment contrary to reason is contrary to Nature and cannot be appropriate. People commonly and habitually make false judgments about matters of indifference. As we saw above, in the practice of right action, one attends the manner in which the bow is held and the arrow is drawn and aimed – without regard to achieving the goal. But when one's heart and mind are set on achieving the goal, the frustration in not achieving that goal can give rise to a predisposition to the false judgments of emotion. It is natural and therefore proper to experience all manner of emotions, but it is not natural or proper to hold on to emotions about those things over which we have no control. Such emotional judgments are the psychic disturbance called 'passion' (*pathos*). The four general passions are distress, fear, appetite, and pleasure.

Because all activities of the *hegemonikon* are corporeal, false judgments about what is good cause the Human Soul (*pneuma psychikon)* to expand, while false judgments about what is bad cause it to contract or shrink. When judgments are contrary to reason they are contrary to Nature, and whatever is contrary to Nature must be removed. To remove a judgment contrary to Nature requires that one remove the cause of the false judgment, and the cause of the false judgment is ignorance. To remove the cause of false judgment requires an understanding of what things are truly good, what are bad, and what are indifferent.

As is the case with the polarity of true and false, the opposite of disturbance of the passions are the serene and reasonable actions of the soul in the good states, also known as the good passions. The three good emotions are joy, caution, wishing, and the three good emotions produce six good emotional states:

- Joy = mirth and cheerfulness
- Caution = modesty and reverence
- Wishing = benevolence and friendliness

Joy is the opposite of pleasure. Wishing, also felt as kindliness and contentment, is the opposite of Appetite. Caution, also felt as respect, is the opposite of Fear. There is no good state indicated as the opposite of distress, because distress is a false judgment about the present, which for the wise is not possible. The wise understand what things are in our power and what things are not in our power. Only virtue is in our power, and because it is always in our power to respond virtuously, there can be nothing bad in the present.

27. Virtue

Classical Stoics hold that there are no degrees of virtue (good), or the absence of virtue, (evil). *Only* virtue is necessary for happiness; all else is indifferent. According to Epictetus, good and evil are up to us (decisions of the will); all the rest are externals (indifferent). The virtues are the good, and they are unified. They are one. Such a thing is possible in like manner as a poet, a farmer, and a statesman can all be one and the same person. To have one virtue is to have them all; to lack one virtue is to lack them all. Virtue is the perfection of reason. As the soul is reason itself, all virtues belong to reason,

and the Nature of that reason is knowledge. Thus, all virtues are manifestations of knowledge; and the lack of knowledge, or ignorance, is the cause of the lack of virtue, which is vice, or evil. *All virtues—wisdom, justice, courage, and sophrosyne—are attributes of the first cardinal virtue, wisdom*.

28. Wisdom

Wisdom is the knowledge of what is good or bad or neither. Stoics often equate wisdom with prudence, which is the practical exercise of wisdom. Thinking ahead and weighing the likely consequences of one's actions, then applying knowledge to the decision-making process is wisdom in action. Choosing those things in agreement with Nature rather than against Nature is the expression of reason, the practice of wisdom, and the exercise of prudence. Only one with perfect wisdom can know the perfection of virtue, and such moral goodness is the ideal of wisdom. According to Zeno, the wise man is attracted to virtue while the fool is attracted to vice, which is ignorance of what is good, or bad, or neither. Just as through the soul the living comes into being, so too from the practice of wisdom does the wise comes into being. To be wise, one must know the world and the self, continually separating the true from the false, the real from the illusion, and then live accordingly.

29. Justice

Justice is the knowledge of how things are to be distributed. Justice begins in human kind's social instinct, *Social Oikeiosis*, strengthening the bonds of society by benevolent acts even as unjust acts weakening the same bonds because they are injurious to another's family, friends, country, property, or person. Justice in our dealings with others takes into account the fairness of each individual's interest when measured against every other interest in the prevention of harm and in the distribution of benefit.

30. Courage

Courage is the knowledge of what things are to be confronted. Courage begins with personal ambition, the desire for greatness in the performance of useful actions noted for their difficulty or danger. The two attributes of courage are bravery and boldness. Bravery is not the lack of fear but the management of it. Boldness is overcoming the temerity that restricts our ambitions and expands our vision of what things are possible. The perfection of courage is in facing what we fear and becoming masters of it.

31. *Sophrosyne* (aka, Decorum)

The Greeks of antiquity had difficulty defining *Sophrosyne* because there was no Latin equivalent. The closest Latin word they found was *decorum*. Decorum is the knowledge of self-control and how to be steadfast. It is the regulation of all of our appetites, emotions, and desires. Reason and experience teach us what things we manage best with moderation and what things we manage best with abstinence. A rational person uses reason to direct and control the appetites as well as the development of a dignified propriety or noble bearing in appearance, speech, and manners.

32. The Goal of Life

The goal of life is to live in agreement with Nature, the Stoic god. Nature created life so that the dearest thing to each creature is its own constitution. Thus, the Primary Impulse of all life is self-preservation, seeking the beneficial and avoiding the harmful according to the special requirements of each constitution. It is natural for small children and other sentient creatures to live by non-rational impulses, which we know as instinct, but with maturity it then becomes natural for human beings to live according to their highest faculty, reason. A human being who lives in agreement with Nature lives in agreement with reason, because the soul is reason itself, the Logos. The nature of that reason becomes for us a knowledge of what things are truly good, what are bad, and what are indifferent. Only the virtues are always a benefit to us and, therefore, truly good. The perfection of reason is the perfection of virtue, human excellence is moral excellence, and the work of perfection is sufficient for happiness *(eudaimonia*). This is what is meant by living in agreement with Nature, our nature and all Nature, which is the final goal of life.

* * * *

APPENDIX A:
The Phenomenon of Existence

the POE*

God is Nature, and Nature is divine,
the One, the Whole that is greater than
the sum of its parts. Life.

From the One comes the Two Things,
always in motion, flux, the cosmos
composed of Dynamic Continua.

Among the Continua we find
Beauty, Truth, and Love—
great Treasures of humankind.

But there is there an even higher good,
because it is always good
and never compromised, Aretē.

And Aretē is an excellent disposition
and evolution of the soul practicing
Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Decorum.

And those who practice Aretē are Stoics,
and the greatest of these they call sages
for they are gods among women and men.

* The POE symbol:

- the circle represents the One, the Whole, et cetera.
- the Diagonal line represents the Dynamic Continuum, bisected by another line creating . . .
- the Treasures, the three triangle spaces representing Beauty, Truth, and Love
- the square framing the whole represents Aretē, the cardinal virtues.

APPENDIX B:
Eros: A Principal Stoic Doctrine

Because we are unable to ask Zeno or Chrysippus what we are allowed to add, subtract, or modify of the original concepts of the Stoa codified 2300 years ago we must work with minimal resources. Nearly everything the early Greek Stoics wrote was deliberately destroyed by conquering Christians and Muslims. However, there are three credible sources of support I have for including Eros, love, as a principal doctrine of the Stoa:

1. Kathy L. Gaca, "Early Stoic Eros," Apeiron Journal for Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2000, pp. 207-38;
2. William O. Stephens, "Epictetus on Stoic Love," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. XIV, 1996, pp. 195-210; and,
3. Encyclopaedia Britannica on *Eros*: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Eros-Greek-god

Eros was the ancient Greek God of love, not Aphrodite. Today, the difference between the two is commonly misunderstood and their roles are often reversed. In early Greek religion Eros was a god and the son of the god Chaos, the "original primeval emptiness of the universe." He represented the recreation of life through the union of the male and female and producing new life therefrom. Aphrodite was the goddess of *sexual* love and beauty. Roman Stoics rarely mentioned Eros, and when they did he was usually denigrated or diminished. The debasement of the great God Eros was complete with Alexandrian poetry's depiction of him as a mischievous child.

The Republic, written by the original Stoic, Zeno, was a utopian city of rather radical ideas about human relations in a communal setting. Without being sidetracked by that remarkable information it's important to know that the patron god Zeno gave to his Republic was Eros (see Gaca). It could have been Apollo or Athena or Zeus himself, but he gave the honor to Eros. Love.

None of this idealism can be seen in ancient Rome (see Stephens). Seneca believed Eros was friendship gone mad (*Letters* IX, 9), and Epictetus considered Eros a kind of divine madness (*Discourses* Bk 4, Chpt One), but is that really Eros? Is that romantic love or a physical attraction inflamed by lust, the sexual love of Aphrodite? Of all the Romans, only Marcus Aurelius appears to have a "normal" appreciation for love in the affairs of humanity.

In my experience with Stoics today Eros is something that is seldom mentioned. Early in my philosophical discussions with Stoics I once brought up the subject of love. This was in an e-mail to a group of Stoics who corresponded regularly. One member, a professor of philosophy, accused me of "being in my cups." In other words, he thought I must be drunk. And I've found that this attitude to be common among persons whose mental faculties are more highly developed than their hearts. Eros is everywhere in nature, it is *of* Nature, it is nurturing, socializing, and re-creative. Stoics must include the concept of love, and restore Eros to his rightful place in our world.

Specific References for the Principal Doctrines

See General Bibliography below for book title and publishing information.

1. Baltzly, pp. 3-4; Coplestone, pp. 388-89; Gould, pp. 99-102; Long, pp. 108, 145-47, 152-60; Rubarth, pp. 3-5; Sambursky, pp. 36-37; Sandbach, pp. 72-73, 78
2. Ibid.
3. Long, pp. 157-8; Rubarth, p. 4; Sambursky, pp. 95-106
4. Long, pp. 152, 156; Rubarth, p. 3; Sandbach, pp. 71-72
5. Gould, pp. 103-107; Long, pp. 160-70; Mates, p. 18; Sambursky, pp. 17-20, 110-15
6. Inwood & Gerson, pp. 165-170 [II-28-44]; Long, pp. 132, 138, 161 n.1
7. This doctrine closely follows the tradition of the Early Stoa (see Kathy L. Gaca, "Early Stoic Eros," *Apeiron Journal for Ancient Philosophy,* Vol. 33, No. 3, 2000, pp. 207-38) in contrast with the deliberate repression of Eros in the Roman Stoa (see William O. Stephens, "Epictetus on Stoic Love," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, Vol. XIV, 1996, pp. 195-210). Also see Hadot, pp. 230-1, and see Appendix B above.
8. Gould, pp. 33, 123-27; Long, pp. 168, 213 n.2; Rubarth, p. 5; Sambursky, pp. 11-16, 106f; Sandbach, pp. 78-9
9. Baltzly, pp. 5-6; Gould, pp. 137-52; Long, pp. 163-70, 198-9; Sandbach, pp. 85-91
10. Gould, pp. 129-31; Long, pp. 171-8; Rubarth, pp. 5-7
11. Coplestone, p. 386; Gould, pp. 31, 53-9; Long, pp. 126-7; Rubarth, pp. 7-8; Sandbach, pp. 95-100
12. Gould, pp. 59-60; Long, p. 124; Sandbach, pp. 89-91
13. Baltzly, pp. 7-8; Gould, pp. 61-65; Long, pp. 127-9; Mates, pp. 33-36; Rubarth, p. 8; Sandbach, pp. 85-87
14. Gould, pp. 53-59; Long, pp. 126-7; Rubarth, pp. 7-8; Sandbach, pp. 86-89
15. Baltzly, pp. 6-7; Long, pp. 135-8; Mates, pp. 11-19; Rubarth, p. 8; Sandbach, pp. 96-97
16. Gould, p. 69; Long, p. 138; Mates, p. 17; Sandbach, pp. 96-99
17. Baltzly, p. 5; Long, pp. 139-45; Mates, chapter V, "Arguments"; Sandbach, p. 97
18. Long, p. 124; Rubarth, pp. 10-11
19. Baltzly, p. 10; Gould, pp. 166-167; Long, pp. 172-3, 184-7; Rubarth, pp. 9- 10; Sandbach, p. 60; Stephens, pp. 2-3
20. Ibid; Gould, pp. 164-66; Long, pp. 172, 185-8, 191; Rubarth, p. 10; Sandbach, pp. 32-35; Stephens, pp. 2-3
21. Ibid; Gould, pp. 33-34; Long, pp. 187, 192-4, 197-206; Rubarth, pp. 10-11; Sandbach, pp. 28-31; Stephens, pp. 3-4
22. Ibid.; Long, pp. 111, 169, 181-3
23. Ibid.; Long, pp. 111, 193
24. Baltzly, *Ataktos*, p. 9; Gould, pp. 177-179; Long, pp. 192-4; Sandbach, pp. 45-48; Stephens, pp. 4-5
25. Baltzly, p. 13-14; Gould, pp. 181-182; Long, pp. 206-7, 219; Sandbach, pp. 59-68
26. Baltzly, p. 14; Gould, pp. 184-186; Long, pp. 176-8; Rubarth, pp. 10-12; Sandbach, pp. 59-68; Stephens, pp. 5-6
27. Gould, pp.168, 174, 180-1; Long, pp.197-206; Sandbach, pp.41-5; Stephens p.4, 6
28. Campbell, pp. 36-39; Gould, pp. 34, 108, 168, 170; Kimpel, pp. 215, 279; Long, ibid; Sandbach, pp. 42, 46
29. Campbell, pp. 40-47; Gould, p. 170; Long, ibid; Sandbach, pp. 42, 124
30. Campbell, pp. 23-28; Gould, p. 170; Long, ibid; Sandbach, pp. 42, 125
31. Campbell, pp. 29-35; Gould, p. 170; Sandbach, pp. 42, 125-126
32. Baltzly, p. 10, *Ataktos*, p. 9; Gould, pp. 166-167; Long, pp. 197-9; Sandbach, pp. 52-59; Stephens, pp. 1-2

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